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In 1 9 8 2 ,  the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis initiated an Innovation Management Task that brought 
together many leading managers from the electrotechnoiogy 
industry as well as researchers and policy makers. This endeavor 
resulted in several meetings with the active parti-cipation and 
support of representatives from industry from both East and West. 
The first of these meetings, of which Electrosila was one of the 
supporting organizations, took place in Leningrad in May 1 9 8 2 .  
This meeting also identified the focus of those future activities 
that were esteemed to be of predominant importance for managers 
in the electrotechnology industry. These included the strategic 
development of a company, and the human and organizational 
factors in managing innovation. 
In his paper, Professor Thomas H. Lee prr.sc?nts an overvlew 
of i-nnovation management in the United States electrotechnology 
industry from an historical perspect-ive. He touches on all three 
factors t.hat were recommended at the Leningrad meeting and 
describes them from the point of view of his many years of first- 
hand experience and direct involvement. Further, he describes 
the role of the user in as much as it significantly effects the 
technical development of the industry. 
The paper describes in clear, concise scientific terms the 
interaction of new technologies and the economy of industrial 
performance as well as national policy and its impact on the 
overall development-. 
This paper wlll he of i r l l . c . r e s t .  r r o t  only to policy 
researchers, but also t.o managers from industry and decision 
makers in government. It is also a welcome sign to all former 
participants in the innovation management meetings that IIASA 
strongly supports this activity. 
Boris Fomln 
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INTRODUCTTON L .  - pp 
The electric power jrldustry in the USA is slightly more than 
100 years old. The first power station, Pearl Street in New York 
City, was built by Thomas Edison and began operation in 1882. 
Since then, the generating capacity in the USA has grown to over 
600,000 megawatts, linked by transmission networks that spread 
over the continental part of the nation. For many years, the US 
electric power industry was one of the world leaders in 
developing large and efficient power plants, reliable 
transmission systems, and sophisticated power system operations. 
In this brief paper, we do not attempt to review all the 
innovat-ions and how they were managed; but rather we highlight. 
some of the important lessons learned by us in our active 
involvement in the management of innovation for the electric 
power industry in the USA. We also try to compare the lessons we 
learned with some recent research on the process of innovation. 
In the USA, the management of innovation (the translation of 
ideas unt-o useful products or processes) in the electrical 
industry can be characterized by three different regimes. In an 
historical sense, these regimes overlap. The first regime is the 
traditional development of new products and processes by the 
vendors of electrical equipment in response to market forces. 
This regime was predominant from the beginnings of electric power 
until about 1970 and continues'today, but at a reduced level. 
The second regime was that of federal support for the 
development of technologies of value to the electrical industry, 
although federal objectives were not necessarily in support of 
that industry. This regime began with the advent of World War I 1  
and the development of two technologies - nuclear power and radar 
- to assist. the war effort. After World War 11, federal support- 
continued, particularly for the development of nuclear power. In 
addition, other electric generation technologies began to receive 
federal support. In the 1950s, the government supported the 
dev~lopmcnt of gas turbines for aircraft, which led to the 
int. rcrrduct- on in 1961 of gas t.urbine electric generation plants. 
In the 1.9hOs, it also supported the development of fuel cells and 
pnotovoltaics for the space program, and, from the early 1970s, 
it provided support for other technologies - solar, thermal, 
wind, geothermal, electrical systems, batteries, coal 
gasification and liquefaction, fluidized-bed combustion, and 
conservation. 
The third regime is that of direct support by the utilities 
for R & D .  Historically, individual electric utilities had 
supported R h D  by the manufacturers by guaranteeing to purchase 
the products of successful R&D programs. In 1965, the uti-lities 
began a modest voluntary col lect-ive effort to support specific 
pro:ject:s undt3r the E; I ect~rj c Research Counci .I ( E K C )  . This sul)pcjrt 
w a s  ?reat l y  broad~n~cl in 1972 wjth t h ~  creation o-f t-he F : l ~ c : t  r l c  
I ) ~ ~ W F - I -  H(-~tlr>r~h 1r1st.j tut-e (1h:l)HI . ' I 'h i  s regime cont-inlies totla)- ;is 
a s ~ q n i  f icant part of the R&l) process of el ect-r ic p ~ , w c . i -  
ycncrat-ion and 11t-i l j  zat ion. 
The support of R&D by the vendors, t:hr yovernment-, and the 
utilities was greatly influenced by changes in the social and 
economic environment which occurred in the 1970s. The cost of 
electric Emwer, which had been declining since the turn of the 
century, began to rise (Figure 1); and state public utility 
commissions began to scrutjnize utility finances more carefu.ily. 
New regulatory agencies were established - the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970 and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) in 1974. Congress passed the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in late 1969, which required 
Environmental Impact. Statements (EIS) for a1 1 federally-ljcensed 
projects. Procedures were established for review and approval of 
projects, which allowed consumer and special-interest groups to 
participate in the proceedings. As js described later, these, 
and many other changes, resulted in shifts in the emphasis of R&D 
planning and in the climate for innovation. 
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IT. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE lNDUSTRY 
--
To understand the innovative process in the US power 
industry, we must begin with an examination of the historical 
development of the industry - the social, economic, and polit-ical 
environment within which the industry operates. 
The electric power industry was created by Thomas Edison, 
who also owned manufacturing operations. There was also an early 
intimate relationship between the utilities and manufacturing 
companies, who owned significant fractions of the equities of t-he 
former. The mot-ivation for the manufacturers to innovate was 
thus very strong. Although legal considerations finally led to 
the break-up of this initial relationship, and eventually to a 
much larger user (utility) sector, it was responsible for the 
heavy dependence of the users on the manufacturers to do the R&D 
necessary for most of the 100-year history of the industry. 
The electric power business is different from many other 
businesses in the USA. While it operat-es in a market economy, 
like other businesses, it also faces a unique regulatory 
environment. In the market economy, electric power must compete 
against other energy sources; for example, against natural gas 
and oil for space and water heating, cooking, and transportation. 
The electric utilities must compete against generation facilities 
owned by industrial enterprises. At the same time, the utilities 
must satisfy the regulatory agencies, whose interests focus 
mainly on the protection of the consumers, instead of the 
stockholders who own the utility companies. This latter force 
has two important effects: first, it forces the uti1i.t~ 
companies t-o provide re1 iable power suppl ies and, second, it 
forces the utility to keep the price of electricity down. The 
combinat.ion of market forces and regulatory pressure had a 
profound influence on the "users' needs" that drive the 
innovative process. Emphasis on economy of scale, energy 
conversion efficiency, and higher transmission voltages are all 
consequences of this combination. 
The regujatory environment also had a great deal of 
influence on the attit.udes of electric power companies toward 
H b D .  If H h D  expenses are borne directly by the utilities, they 
are a part of the utilities' operating expenses and are thus 
reflected in the rates charged for electricity. Such R&D 
expenses are, of course, scrutinized by the state regulators. If 
the manufacturers pay R&D expenses and recover them in the price 
of the equipment, there is less need for the utilities to defend 
them to the regulators. To provide the manufacturers with 
incentive for advanced product development, the leading 
utilities, such as Ameri-can Electric Power, would guarantee the 
purchase of a nilmb~r of units once the new product has been 
t.est-ed to t-he sateisfaction of the user. The user, in addit-ion, 
w o ~ l l d  . ~ l s o  offer it,s system for testing. 
So, tho dt?~)r?ndr.nc:e on manufacturers for R h 9  r.c3nt~ i ni~ed u n t  i 1 
t-he late I O h O s ,  when significant socj.al changes began t:o appear. 
Within the industry, the enforcement of the anti-trust. law 
against price fixing brought more competitive pressure on the 
manufacturers (even though there were doubts as to whether the 
price-fixing conspiracy really worked). At the same time, 
foreign competition intensified. Suppliers in foreign countries 
sometimes enjoyed governmc.nt subsi-dies for the development of 
state-of-the-art products and were able t-o offer prices to US 
utilities lower than those offered by US manufacturers. 
Complaints and antidumping suits did not produce any favorable 
results. This further weakened the ti-ght link between 
manufacturers and utility companies. Manufacturers became more 
conscious of the cost.-benefit relationship in R&D expenditures. 
Utilities became less willing to offer purchasing commitments to 
stimulate R&D in US manufacturing firms. 
In analyzing cost-benefit relationships of R&D projects more 
critically, manufacturers discovered that certain projects were 
of interest principally to utility companies. For example, the 
knowledge required for the physical construction of high voltage 
transmission lines was important to the utilities, but was of 
little use to the manufacturers of high voltage equipment. In 
addition, the relative merits of high voltage a.c. transmission 
versus high voltage d.c. transmission were important to the 
utilities, but were not critical to the manufacturers, 
particularly because the results of this type of research, when 
carried out by utilities, were made public and were available 
to all competing manufacturers. As a result, a number of R&D 
needs evolved that required the utilities themselves to undertake 
some R&D. 
Other issues, not related to electrical equipment R&D, but 
important to the public interest, also appeared at about the same 
time. These were the environmental and public health and safety 
aspects of electric power production and transmission. Support 
for RtiD on this issues became the responsi-bilities of either the 
utilities or federal government. Therefore, in an evolutionary 
way, the electric utilities undertook a collective R&D program, 
first. through the Edison Electric Institut-e (an industry 
association for prlvate ut-i 1 it.y compani es 1 ,  then through the ERC 
(a cooperatjve effort. between prjvate and pilblic utillt-y 
companies), and, f ina 1 1 y, through an industry-wide research 
institute - EPRI, which was organized in 1973. After that, 
innovation management in the US electric power industry underwent 
a significant change. In this paper, we try to cover the lessons 
both before the formation of EPRI and the years hence. It, 
therefore, is useful to keep in mind the very important changes 
in the circumstances under which innovations were introduced. 
I - I- T . -- THE -. --- USERS-' _-ROI,E' 
A number of resea r c h ~ r s  on t-echno logy ~nnovat-ion have 
po~ntcd o::t t h ~  1rnpo1-t~nre of users in thc prilcpss. Von Fllppel 
I 1  1 st-atcxc!: 
o Approximat el y thrcr out of foi~r commerc~al ly sl~ccrssful 
~nd~~stri'*J qcmd ~ n n o v ~ t  zon progects arc initiated in 
response to a pcrctxpt-ion of user need. 
o Accurate understanding of user need is the factor which 
discriminates most strongly between commercially successfui 
industrial good innovation projects and those which fail 
[ ? I .  
flc further suggested L 3 1  that lead users are an important 
source of novel product concepts and that appropriatability of 
innovation benefit can be a predictor of the source of 
innovation. It is of interest to examine experiences in the 
utility industry (which did not do R & D  on its own for many years) 
in light of these conclusions. 
We illustrate the importance of understanding users' needs 
with three examples. 
Example -. - 1 . - -- - - Steam - Turb* Generators 
The utilities' need to reduce the cost of electricity was 
the driving force to improve conversion efficiency (Figure 2 ) ,  
and to rely on economy of scale (Figure 3 )  afforded by building 
larger plants. 
DRIVING FORCES FOR LOWER COST 
H~storical developme"t of 
USA steam rlrrb~neqenerators 
b ' l q 1 1  r e  2 : tl i st-or i r.;il titjckgroulld oi USA S:_cam 
T'urh? n e  Generators 
LARGEST US TURBlNElGENERATOR ORDERED 
r 
I , I I I I 
56 60 64 68 7 2 76 
Year of order 
Figure 3 
There were two dominant suppliers of turbine generat-ors in 
the USA: General Electric (GE) and Westinghouse. These major 
competitors marched neck-and-neck in the race for higher 
efficiency and larger size. In the process, they followed two 
different strategies. GE put more emphasis on reliability 
leadership, while Westinghouse on cost leadership. In adopting 
the reliabiiity leadership strategy, a number of programs were 
put. in place by GE, such as: 
o An lnternal pollcy not to ~ncrease slxe by more than 20% 
over the larqest unit. 
o A field program to document the performance, f a ~ l u r e  rates, 
and fallure effects in the ciistomer's plants. 
o Kc1 ldhl i lty eng~neers asslgned to the fleld. 
o Fieavy lnvestmcnt ln materials R & D .  
o Analys~s and promotion of the economic value of rel~ablllty. 
One sales brochure pointed out that "if the availability of 
a competitor's turbine is lower by a few percent, the customer 
cannot afford to have that turbine for free". 
The other competitor, Westinghouse, invested in new and 
cost-reduced designs; and was, in general, more aggressive in 
larger size units and claimed leadership in efficiency. 
One interesting fcdtiir~ in the turbine generator markrt. was 
that t t l ~  u t  I 1lt1 es did evaluat e rc-llab~l~ty and eff lclency ~n the 
dcclsi on-n\.ik-I nq proce,ss; but thcy would not actual l y pay for the 
c:la~rnc,d Ir~adersh~p, slnc-e both propertlcs are d~fflcult to 
measure and arc not quarantrr.d bv the manufacturers. But In the 
lonq run, the oi~tcome was clear. The competitor wit-h the 
rel~~k)lllty stratrqy won, as reflected by the two-thlrds market 
share ~t enjoycd over an extended perlod of tlme. 
The point is that reliability is more important to the user 
than initial cost, because the price of the turbine generator is 
only about 10% of the total cost of the plant. A forced outage 
is a costly nuisance. Even though the users would not pay a 
significant premium, they rewarded the reliability supplier in 
market share. 
Example 2 - Circuit Breakers for 500 kV Systems 
For transmission systems at voltages of 345 kV and below, 
lightning was always the most difficult duty for insulation 
design, i.e., if insulation systems can handle lightning strokes, 
they can handle satisfactorily other types of surges in the 
system. For 500 kV systems it was found that this criterion does 
not hold. Power surges, caused when circuit breakers are closed 
onto a line with trapped charges, represent a more difficult duty 
t.han lightning. It was also found that the magnitude of these 
switching surges is a statistical phenomenon, influenced by a 
number of factors, such as the point in the voltage wave at which 
the breakers close and the difference in timing between the 
closing of the three phases in a three-phase breaker. Thus, 
statistical criteria are needed for the design of the mechanical 
operators of the breaker. Two slightly different criteria were 
chosen by the competitors. One chose a very low probability 
(less than 1%) of having a surge voltage more than twice the 
normal, while the other chose a surge voltage 10-15% higher for 
the same probability. The consequences of the different crit-eria 
were that the more stringent criterion was more costly, but the 
probability of line flashovers on closing was much lower. The 
manufacturer using this criterion was not able to obtain, 
however, either a premium price or a higher market share and, 
eventually, it went out of the business. 
Why? Reliability in this case was not as important. If a 
line flashes over on breaker closing, the breaker will open and, 
after a given elapsed time (less than a second), it will attempt 
t.o close again. Since switching surge is a statistj.cal 
phenomenon, it is very likely that the second attempt would he 
successful. Therefore, damage due to the flashover is rather 
insignificant and the user is not prepared to pay for the added 
reliability. 
Example 3 - Speed of Circuit Breakers 
The development of high-speed circuit breakers is a good 
example of innovation by a lead user. Philip Sporn [41, one of 
the outstanding leaders in the American utility industry, in 
commenting on the need for improvement in the speed of circuit- 
breakers and its effect on the performance of transmission 
syst-ems, notied : 
Thi s, too, was a much-debated sl~h;jcct.. , and the 
idea that speed was a sort of acad~m~c: Iuxllry, rath~r 
than a prcsgrc.ss-rct lat.eti nrcr~ssi ty, q;i i  ncd sol id font i rhq 
in the indust-ry. This idea was so well acccpt:cd that 
in the late 1930s, the Switching and Swit~chgear 
Committee of AEIC (Association of Edison lllum~natinq 
Companies) wrote a report and unanimously asserted its 
conviction t-hat. nothing faster than 8 cycles was needed 
in the way of tire opening of a circuit on a 60-cycle 
system. Somc dozen or more out-standing engineering 
representatives of the power industry signed this 
report. and presented it at an annual meeting of the 
Association. I dissented from this view and gave the 
reasons for my strong conviction that these conclusions 
were completely invalid. Consequently, these views of 
the committee - a national committee, in effect - were 
rejected on the AEP (American Electric Power) System 
and by one perceptive manufacturer. Thus it was 
possible to encourage effectively the development of 
fast.er and faster breakers, to the point where on this 
system 2-cycle breakers at higher voltages are now 
standard, and the search for a still faster breaker is 
now going on. 
All the advanC.ages of speed of breaker opening, 
including preclusion of long-duration heavy over- 
currents with their consequent destruction of lines and 
equipment, avoidance of loss of synchronous load, the 
consequent feasibility of rapid and ultrarapid 
reclosure, were completely overlooked by a select 
techni-cal group representing an entire industry. The 
need for greater speed in both openi-ng and reclosing a 
circuit has since been recognized by the industry, 
although there is still a tendency to lag in the effort 
to push beyond current standards. 
'l'hc~se examples clearly show t hat the cc>ncluslon drawn by von 
Hippel for instruments are also applicable to the electric power 
industry. 
IL . I?[!MAN -- HI;:SOlil<CF. MANACF':MI<h"J' 
Tcj Improve the coupling between manufa~t~urers and users, 
many human resource managemerit programs have been developed. We 
briefly review a few of them here to indicate the importance of 
this activity. All the examples here were the programs of GE.  
For many years, GE offered a power system engineering 
program to engineers in utility companies. The candidates came 
to Schenectady, NY, for one year, during which they were taught 
power systems courses comparable to a master's program, and had 
many opportunities to interact with GE personnel and visit GE 
plants and laboratories. At the end, in addition to gaining a 
gooti qr,ciluat.c education, the candidat-es developed personal 
ac:c~i~. lr i  jt a n < - t x s  w t ~  i cij b~-.c:,>me t.he foi~ndation for fut.urc i nt-rractlitrn. 
Enr a f! tz \cLdrs, t f ~ i .  m,~rl;igt~mc~nt in ( ; F , ' s  t ransnllssiun 
(jl~iElc>n in f 1 J ,  I i,rn, 11ji-1 t r ,  ,~ncl t h e  I{onncvl 1 le P0wf.r Adminlstrat-ion, 
a gc)vcrrrnrf\nt -owr)c.cll i~ti 1 J ty comkmnv, had an 6-xchange program. 
l-.ac.h WOII i cll s(  nc! one fBnq I nce t- every ycar to C h c  other orqanl zat i on 
to work for ,t wc.r,k. t? l t ~~trugh t 111s r)r i>y ram dld not ldst bery long 
because of management changes, feedback today indicates that it 
usefully increased technical dialogue. 
Perhaps the most interesting program was the old, now non- 
existent, test program in GE. In the 1940s and 1950s, GE hired 
about 600 graduates from engineering schools. They were d l 1  
assigned to a test program for about a year, during which they 
were given four 3-month assignments to test the equipment 
produced in the factory. On completion, t.hey were interviewed 
for permanent jobs in the company. On average, there were only 
300 openings, so half of the 600 usually left the company, but 
they had become quite familiar with some of the GE products. A 
significant fraction joined utility companies. Again, that one 
year laid a good foundation for future interaction. 
V. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS -- AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING 
There are times when a technology is developed or applied 
commercially, but not because of user needs or technology push. 
There are other factors to be considered, such as the application 
of systems analysis and contingency planning. Gas turbine 
technology is such an example. In light of the importance of 
this technology in the electric power industry, we review here 
the historical events. 
The initial development of gas turbines was started by 
technology push. With the development of jet engines, there came 
the possibility of developing an energy conversion system which 
was efficient, lower in cost, and flexible in its use of 
different kinas of fuels. Rut t-he init.ia1 development was rather 
tough going. After many difficult years of R & D  activities, 
commercial gas turbines finally became available. But the 
conservative attitude of the utility industry made it difficult 
to promote the idea that for peak loads, gas turbines were a very 
att.ract.ive choice. The person in charge of the gas turbine 
business in the leading manllfacturing firm hat3 t.o adopt a 
strategy to offer the machine from the shelf. - I f  a ut 11it.y 
company discovered that it forecasted its peak load lower than 
actual, in less than two weeks it could obtain a gas turbine 
generator to fill the gap. In other words, many of the initial 
installations were made to take care of mistakes in forecasting. 
On a much larger scale, the surge in gas turbine orders after the 
1965 northeast blackout occurred for the same reason. 
In the late 1960s, GE felt that there was a need to better 
plan generation additions. An effort was launched to develop a 
computer program to optimize the total cost for utlllty companies 
over an extended perlod of tlme, e.g., 20 years. This was the 
flrst of thls kind, though subsequent-ly several new programs were 
~ntrc)duced to Improve GE's Optlml zed G~nerdt- I on P lc>nn 1 ng ( o k ; I '  
program. I t  mi+>or undr.rtakinq. The, proqr,~rn hdd ,i c j , j t  a 
base  elf < + I  I ma lor gcr~or~it ing fac.11 l t - 1 ~ ~  in the t S A  a n d  t t1c.1 r 
oprrat 1 n 9  charsct prlst IPS. It 1oqgt.d weat hct- drlt a dnd 1 0 . 3 c i  
prof 1 IPS In dl fferent reglons. The output of t rlls !)rogrdm 
~nvarlably ~ndlcated that wlder acceptance of qas turb~ncs for 
peak loads would offer slgniflcant savlngs to the utlllty 
companies. Prior to that, it was inconceivable for large 
utilities, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, to consider 
"small" gas turbines for large systems. The systems analysis did 
reverse that position and firmly established gas turbines as a 
technology for peaking duty. 
After 1973, the growth of electricity demand in the USA 
declined. Because of advanced ordering, the entire utility 
industry faced serious overcapacity, so the domestic gas turbine 
market disappeared for all practical purposes. And in 1978, the 
US Government passed the Fuel Use Act, prohibiting the use of 
natural gas for electricity generation after 1990. The country 
was running out of gas! 
This was a severe blow to t.he future of gas turbine technol- 
ogy. In fact, Westinghouse did close its plant in Round Rock, 
but GEl's gas turbine business was saved by a very aggressive and 
clever international strategy: the formation of a network of 
manufacturing associat-es (MAS . Under the arrangement, GE 
offered technical information to MAS so that they could build the 
stationary part of the gas turbine while GE built the rotating 
part. GE guaranteed the performance to the MAS. Although in the 
international marketplace, GE and MAS were competitors; because 
of differences in marketing strength, financing capability and 
historical national relationships, this arrangement permitted the 
"GE design" to enjoy a very significant market share. By doing 
the advanced R&D needed, GE was able to keep the MA network in 
operation (in 1983, the People's Republic of China signed up as 
an MA), and to keep the gas turbine technology moving ahead. 
A key to the success of this strategy was advanced R&D. 
F~gure 4 shows the progress, both technical and econom~cal, for 
one of the macnlnes, Figure 5 shows the increasing importdnce of 
MAS, and F~gure 6 shows the importance of MAS in different 
geograph~cal locations. 
In 1986, 13 years after the energy crisis, the situation is 
very different. There is now a broader acceptance of the 
possibiJity that natural gas may still be a very important source 
of energy for t.he foreseeable future. Combined cycles utilizing 
natural gas offer much lower capital cost and higher efficiency. 
A new generation of gas turbines, significantly different from 
jet engines, is now under development. Conversion efficiencies 
of 55% appear to be technically and economically feasible. The 
future of gas turbine technology now looks very bright. 
Had GE failed to put in place the innovative international 
strategy, the USA may not be able to enjoy its leadership in 
comblned cycle technology today. 
A PRIME EXAMPLE - THE MS 5001 
F ~ r ~ n g  temp. 
Pressure ratlo 
PIP , N 
arid Spec~flc output 
Wh~ch ~ncreased unlt output Coupled wlth a reduct~on Resulted In a decl~ne In 
manufactured unll cosr the constant prlce per KW 
SIKW Iconstant dollars (constant dollars) to customers 
Figure 4 
Technology advancement 1s cr~ t~ca l l y  important to rhe markptah~l~ry of the MA product (as ~t Ir to GE) .  
as evtdenced by how qulcklv rhey puck up the new technology and how !t has affected their bur!ness growth 
SHIPMENTS Total market 
M o d ~ l  N sh~pments rap~dly became larqp 
perrenraqe of total 5001 s h ~ p m ~ n t s  In 
power generarlon sectors 
t ' i  yilrt? 5 
And in areas otherwise d ~ f f ~ c u l t  for GE to penetrate. 
ICUMULATIVE SHIPMENTS THROUGH 19751 
T R I F S  W u E n C  L A A .  CETS 
. . 
'?KGBEN MECH,DR KK.(;EN MECH.DR. PWR. GEN. M E C H  DR. 
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M A  -78%- -229',- - 73% 17% 14% as%-_ 92% - 8% -- - 
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France Iran Tunerla Ausrr la Rema~ning Industrial Markets 
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But, in addltion to the creatlve lnternatlonal strategy, 
anr~ther ronsideration was important In the innovative process, 
~ . e . ,  t h ~  question of contingency planning. In 1975, Marchett~ 
1 5 1  (C~qurr. 7 )  s u g q ~ s t e d  that dfter 011, natural gas would be the 
dornlnant energy supply for several decades. 
WORLD PRIMARY ENERGY SURSTITUTION 
Nuclear 
That forecast was very difficult for Americans to accept. 
In 1978, President Carter introduced the previously mentioned 
Fuel Use Act. and GE spent. billions of dollars to acquire Utah 
International, a major coal company. The country's national 
policy was to depend on coal and nuclear energy, so Marchetti's 
forecast was highly controversial. During one debate on this, 
the point was made that planners should not find themselves 
debating which forecast is correct, a hopeless endeavor. The 
questions that should be asked were: "What does it mean if 
Marchetti's forecast turned out to be correct?" and "Should the 
company protect itself against such a contingency?" 
The answer to the first question was obvious: the large 
steam turbine business would lose its importance in power genera- 
tion and the gas turbine business would become more important. 
The answer to the second question was a business decision. If 
the decision was to protect against such a contingency, then the 
R & D  efforL on gas turbine technology should continue. In GE's 
case, both the international strategy and the need for 
contingency planning led to the same conclusion. The decisions 
were, therefore, straightforward. In other situations, 
contingency planning should be seriously considered as a very 
important factor in innovation management. 
Finally, we should mention the importance of market forces 
on innovation. In commenting on an expected load growth of only 
2 to 2.5% per year in 1985, Craig Tedmon of the GE R & D  Center 
stated: 
That kind of load growth decreases the incentive 
for utilities to he venturesome in adding technically 
innovative new capacity. It increases the incentive 
for utilities to upgrade existing capacity. 
The extent to which utilities upgrade, rebuild, 
and ot-herwise stretch out the life of the1 r existing 
equipment adds further uncertainty about fut-ure 
markets. And the greater the uncertainty, the harder 
the electrical manufacturing industry finds it to 
justify and support the rapid and costly development of 
radically new technology. 
Technology opportunities do exist today, and in 
many cases they are very significant. 
So it's not a question of technology opportunities 
not existing. It's a question of the market driving 
forces not being in place. 
I want to make a very ~rnportant dist 1nc.tion here 
between market d r l  V I  ng for<-es ,~nd c>conom~c driving 
forces. kou can makc a very nlce c.c-ononic ,j~-.j~~r~f-nt In 
favor of each of tile techno1 ogles 1 've merit lent-d. 
But economic feasibi 1 ity isn't market feasihi 1 it-y . 
The economically feasible things will happen only 
if the market forces are right. And market forces are 
influenced by barriers. Right now those barriers are 
high - barriers of slow load growth, high costs, 
uncertain financial health, uncertainties about fuel 
cost and availability, environmental issues, 
reliability questions, and the regulatory environment. 
From the point of view of the manufacturers, the 
barriers are excess manufacturing capacity that keeps 
profit margins low, and strong foreign competition, 
aided by a strong dollar and foreign government 
protectionist trade policies and subsidies. All of 
these do not invalidate the long-run economic arguments 
favorable to new technology. But they do put high 
barriers in the way of the development of markets for 
those technologies. [61 
VI . FEDEXAL GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN INNOVATION 
Two technologies supported by the government during and 
after World War I1 are of particular significance to the electrlc 
power industry: nuclear reactors and jet engines. 
The development of nuclear power in the USA represents a 
unique involvement of federal government in a massive and 
directed support of the process of innovation - from the 
collection of necessary scientific data to the construction of 
demonstration nuclear power plants. 
In no period in history there has been, as a result of a 
combi.nation of circumstances, a more rapid innovation, that is, a 
t ransl at-ion of theoret-ical ideas into widely used t-echnology. 
These circumstances included not only the intellectual challenge 
of investigating a new realm of science and technology, hut also 
the ability, under the exigencies of war, to engage prominent 
scientj sts and engineers in an enterprise of hi.gh priority. The 
management of this innovative process during World War I 1  has 
been described by Smyth [71 and Seaborg [ 8 1 .  
Development of nuclear power did not begin, however, 
immediat.ely after World War 11. On January 14, 1946, Bernard 
Baruch presented a US proposal to the United Nations Atomic 
Energy Commission to establish an international agency with 
exclusive authority to own all nuclear materials and to conduct 
all dangerous nuclear operations (i.e., operations of military 
significance) [91. This proposal was not accepted and the 
US government decided that the science and technology developed 
in the Manhattan Project would remain secret (with the exception 
of the informat.j.on provlded in the Smyth report [71). Congress 
p c 3 s s ~ t l  t-he Atom.ic t.<nt?rgy Act. of 1 9 4 6 ,  which prohibited any 
pcacr-,fi11 nuc: 1 car cooprration 11nt:i 1 Congress was sati sf iczd t.hat- 
intrbt-nati ona 1 sdfi.g~~,irds wc?rt7 in place.  Thj s p c , l  icy of secrecy 
and dt7nj.a 1 not- only ~nhibit-~d commercial de:?vrtlopment. c~f nuc lt->ar 
p<.JWPr in the U S A ,  but a ]  so it was ineffective in preventing other 
count rips from devr loping nuclear e.xplosives. The Soviet. Union 
conduct~d tes1.s of a nuclear fission device in 1949 and a 
thermonuclear device in 1953. The British conducted a test of a 
nuclear explosive in 1952. 
The failure of this pol ic:y of s~clrecy t-o prevent pro1 ifera- 
tion then led the USA to adopt a dramatically different 
approach. In a speech to the United Nations on December 8, 1953, 
President Eisenhower outlined an "Atoms for Peace" program under 
which the USA would declassify the information necessary for 
development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy - including the 
information needed for nuclear power plants. He suggested also 
that the international community nrove toward agreements that 
would assure the availability of the information to all countries 
and that would also address the proliferation question. As a 
result, the International Atomic Energy Agency was established in 
1957. Nations of Latin America agreed to create a nuclear 
weapons free zone in their countries under the 1967 Treaty of 
Tlatalolcol, and 130 nations have subscribed to the Non- 
proliferation Treaty of 1970 under which they agree to forgo the 
development of nuclear explosives in return for access to 
peaceful nuclear technology. 
This new policy of the USA provided the basis for an 
accelerated development of nuclear power beginning in 1954, not 
only in the USA, but also in other countries. There had been 
some development of nuclear power reactors in the USA during the 
1946-1954 period at two of the national laboratories - the 
Argonne National Laboratory first operated the Experimental 
Breeder Reactor-1 in 1961, and the Roiling Reactor Experiment 
(BORAX-1) in 1963. The Oak Ridge National Laboratory completed 
the Elomogenous Reactor Experiment ( H H E - I  ) in 1952. During this 
period, indust-rial fi-rms had a1 so bc~en involved in studies and 
development programs under cont-ract t.o the Atomic Energy Commis- 
sion ( A F C )  , but widespread indust-rial interest in t.he development 
of commercial nuclear power began with the llAt.oms for Peace" 
initiative. 
The pc:r iod from 19.54 to 1965 was marked by the development 
of many different nuclear power systems - some by industry and 
some h y  govr rnmcnt . The c.1. rcumst,ances wtxrc ccinduci vr to 
innovation. There was generous government support for R&D; there 
was public enthusiasm for nuclear power; the demand for 
electricity was increasing by 7% per year; and the low fuel costs 
for nuclear power plants held the hope that they would provide 
lower cost power than other alternatives. To further encourage 
the development of nuclear power, in 1957 Congress passed the 
Price-Anderson Act, which provided a limit on the liability of 
electric utilities in the case of an accident in a nuclear power 
plant. 
Not a1 I the nlicl ear reactor concrpt s devc 1 oped during t.hl s 
pc-rind sur\T~vt-ci a Ft er 1 9 6 5 ,  whcn r,Fc si~pport for reart or 
dt~vc~l ot~,)r>nt h;js rt,d I rrrt t.d a1mc)st cnt I r6 .J  y t o the, k,rc.r--dt--r rc,dc:t or 
cone-txpt . Amonq t ht~ cdslld 1 t I cBs wc.1-c w.i? ~~r-n~odr~~-~>t hc)moqcno~is 
reac-tors, molten-s;+ l t rr-actclrs, organlc-coo lcc! and mo(lc-.r<it-ed 
rrlact-ors , sod1 i~m-cotn 1 cC1 rind cjrdphrte-moderat eel recic-tors , C 0 2 -  
cooled and graph] t-e-mcdcrateci reactors, a n d  b c , ~  l ~ng-superhr-*at 
reactors. These casualties were due to a number of factors. 
Some reactor concepts - homogeneous, molten-salt, and C02- 
graphite reactors - had been developed by national laboratories 
and had no industrial sponsor to continue their development. 
Others - the organic-cooled and the sodium-graphite reactors - 
encountered technical difficulties. The successful reactor 
developments were those that involved the most conventional 
technologies; that is, those that used water as the reactor 
coolant. The adoption of pressurized water reactors by Admiral 
Rickover had a tremendous influence on the sponsorship of 
boiling-water and pressurized-water reactors by major industrial 
firms who were regular suppliers of power plant equipment to the 
electric utilities. These firms were not only able and willing 
to take financial risks, but also had the confident of the 
utilities in terms of supply and service. 
The first commercial order in the USA was in 1963 for the 
Oyster Creek plant. Orders for nuclear plants continued at an 
accelerated pace until about 1975, at which time the social and 
regulatory circumstances had changed to the extent that utilities 
no longer felt they could afford the financial risks involved in 
the construction of nuclear power plants. 
VII. THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT & THE FORMATION OF EPRI 
Since about 1970, the innovative process with regard to the 
supply of electricity has been subject to a variety of social 
pressures, which have profoundly changed the direction of 
innovation. These pressures shifted emphasis toward 
environmental assessment and control, nuclear safety, a1ternatj.v~ 
systems for power generation, conservation and end-use 
technologies, demand management, and the extension of the life of 
existing power plants. 
The social issues that influenced t-he development of 
electric power from 1970 to 1986 included a rising concern about- 
environmental protection, an augmented concern about personal 
healt-h and safety, a growing consumer movement, dramatic changes 
in the economy, shifts in the federal management structure, and a 
growing public distrust of big government and big industry. 
Environmental Issues 
Protection of the environment in the USA began in the late 
nineteenth century with legislation to create national parks and 
forests. The key legislation affecting the electric utilities 
was, as noted previously, the passage of NEPA in 1969, which 
required EISs to be prepared for any project that needed federal 
government approval. At the same time, a new regulatory agency 
was est-ablished, the EPA, and a new agency in the Presidential 
li;xi.c~itivr Off j ct-, the Council on Environmental Qua 1 ity. The 
imp(>:-tance of NEPA was t-hat any group of citi-zens, regardless of 
how s r n ~ 3 j  1 t k l a t  group might be, could question the validity of t.hc 
ETS made by the proposer of a new power station. 
This opportunity for intervention by special-interest groups 
in the const.ruction was to prove a dominant factor in proposals 
to construct not only nuclear power plants, but also fossil-fuel 
power plants and hydropower plants. The importance of N E P A  is 
that the final judgment on environmental protection was often 
shifted from federal agencies to the federal courts. 
In addition to N E P A ,  Congress also passed a large number of 
bills to regulate specific aspects of the environment - clean 
air, clean water, toxic materials, endangered species - to name a 
few (see Figure 8 ) .  In some cases, Congress also mandated 
deadlines by which E P A  was to emplace control regulations. This 
environmental legislation created a great deal of uncertainty for 
the electric utilities, not only as to what the final regulations 
would be, but also as to the delays in construction schedules 
which mi-ght be occasioned by suits brought in the courts. 
Public Health and SafetzIssues 
A dominant theme in US society since 1970 has been a public 
desire to do all possible to reduce their personal risks. A 
concept arose that federal government should grant licenses for 
only those products or operations that presented "zero risk". In 
particular, public concern about the relationship between 
radioactivity and cancer has been an important element in public 
opposition to nuclear power plants. Opponents to nuclear power 
have not only been very talented in raising public concern about 
radioactivity, but have also been very effective in using this 
issue in delaying tactics against the construction of nuclear 
power plants, the transport of radioactive material, and the 
construction of sites for the disposal of radioactive materials. 
As of early 1986, these three issues had not been finally settled 
in terms of public acceptance. The recent accident in Chernobyl 
certainly will intensify and prolong the debate. The level of 
release of radioactive materials from a nuclear power plant 
accident has been an issue of particular importance. Based on 
the data obtained from the accident in Three Mile Island, it has 
been shown that t.he releases of radioactivity were 10 to 100 
times lowt-r than the resolutions assumed by the NHC. The NRC has 
not yet, however, changed its regulations. This issue of release 
of radioactivity during a nuclear accident is of direct interest 
to the electric utilities, since it is an important factor in the 
size of the evacuation zone required around a nuclear plant. 
Because of this unresolved issue, there has been a major emphasis 
on research both by the government and the private sector to 
determine the exact level of release of radioactivity from 
nuclear power plant accidents. 
In addltlon to radioactivity from nuclear operations, there 
are other ~ssues of publlc health concern. One of these 1s 
concern about the possible carcinog~nlc effect of a component of 
the oils used in transformers, the polychlorln.ited blphcnyl s. 
Tht. pl~hl I c h ~ s  a1so b~c-.n conc~rn~v-l about the pass ~ b l  P G I  oloyir-a 1 
ef fr-.ct-s n f  ~lc-ct-romOjqrret. I c f ~ t -  l r l s  under I r a n s m  I ss I ~ ~ r l  I I nc.s .  
These lssi~f-s h a v ~ .  st I m~llat r'd rest'arct~ to assess t ht? slcjnl f icanc-f~ 
of such phenomena, as we11 a s  t~chnologles that col~ld reduce 
publlc exposure. 
US laws o n  env i ronmenta l  p r o t e c t i o n  
Legend : 
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- Riven and Harbors Act (1899) 
- Reclamation Act (1 902) 
- Antiquities Act (1 906) 
- Insecticide Act 11910) 
- Weeks Law (1911) 
- Taylor Grazing Act 119341 
- Flood Control A 3  (1 937) 
- Wildl~fe Restoration ACI (1 937) 
- Fist. and Wildlife Coordination Act (1958) 
- Wilderness Act (19641 
- Solid Waste Disporal Act (1965) 
- Water Resources Planning Act !I9651 
- Na?ional Historic Presewation Act (1 966) 
- Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (19681 
- National Environmental Policy Act (1969) 
- Clean Air Act (19701 
- Occupationai Safety and Health Act 119701 
- Water Pollution Control Act (1972) 
- Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act (1972) 
- Coastal Zone Management Act (1972) 
- Noise Control Act (19721 
- Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (1972) 
- Ports and Waterways Safety Act (1972) 
- Marine Mammal Protection Act (1972) 
- Endangered Species Act (1 973) 
- Deepwater Port Act (1974) 
- Safe Drinking Water Act (1974) 
- Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act (1974) 
- Toxic Substances Control Act (1976) 
- Federal Lend Policy and Management Act (1976) 
- Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ( 1  976) 
- Clean Air Act Amendments (1977) 
- Clean Water A c t  (1977) 
- Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (1977) 
- Soil and Water Resources Conservation Act (1977) 
- Endangered Species Act Amendments 11978) 
- Environmental Education Act (1978) 
- Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (1980) 
- Nuclear Waste Policy Act (1982) 
- Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Amendments 11984) 
- Environmental Programs Assistance Act 119841 
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Consumer Issues 
The consumer movement in the USA has several origins. The 
publication of Ralph Nader's book [I01 "Unsafe at Any Speed" on 
the automobile, the Corvair, and the subsequent action by General 
Motors to discredit Mr. Nader, gave great impetus to the 
movement. This distrust of US industry was augmented by a 
growing public opposit.i.on to the war in Vietnam. Finally, the 
resignation by Presi-dent Nixon over the cover-up of the break-in 
at Watergate convinced the public that neither big industry nor 
big government were to be trusted. As a result, law firms 
devoted to public-interest. causes were created. Congress passed 
a law requiring government agencies to make records available to 
the public under the Freedom of Information Act. In addition, 
Congress passed the so-called Sunshine Act, which requires all 
government commissions to provide access for the public to most 
of their meet.ings. At the state level, offices for public 
defenders were created and, in a few states, Citizens Utility 
Boards were established. There were also requirements that 
government agencies hold public hearings on proposed new 
programs. These actions t-o protect the interests of the consumer 
also provided great uncertaint-y in the process of licensing and 
construction of power plants and, as a consequence, uncertainty 
as well in the planni.ng of R&D programs. 
Economic Issues 
The steady 7% annual increase in the demand for electric 
power during the 1950s and 1960s had led most utilities to 
undertake aggressive programs for the construction of new 
generating plants. In the late 1960s and early 1970s many of t-he 
new plant orders were for nuclear power plants. This rate of 
increase in demand, however, was to begin to change downward 
after 1970 (see Figure 9 ) .  As a result, many utilities found 
that the plants they were building were no longer necessary on 
the time schedule they had expected. For example, of the 139 
nuclear p o w ~ r  plants ordered after 1971, all but 33 have been 
c a n c e , :  l e d .  
In addition, utilities that decided to continue with the 
construction of nuclear plants were faced with a number of 
unexpected fact-ors. The construction time, which was about six 
years for plants completed before 1975, became 10-13 years due to 
new regulatory requirements and interventions in the licensing 
process by special-interest groups. In the late 1970s both 
interest rates and inflation were well above lo%, adding 
significantly to the financing costs of plant construction. 
These circumstances also applied, of course, to the fossil-fuel 
power plants constructed during the same period. Consequently, 
thcse nuclear and fossil-fuel power plants were much more 
expensive t-han ori ginal ly expected. According t-o US practice, 
t h e  c - a p i  t-a l rost of new power pli3nt.s is inc 1udr.d in the 
i nvr.stmcnt h a s c  f o r  dertern~irrinj the rates for c.lcctric powrr only 
upcn complet.ion of t.hr plant-s. Thus, t.h~ h i g h  cost of the lat.cst 
plant-s results in a substantial increase in the rates charged for 
e1ectri.ci.ty. 
Year 
Figure 9: Historical Generation of Electricity in the USA 
In contrast to the historical downward trend in the cost of 
electricity, thjs new phenomenon of upward "rate shock" led many 
State utility commissions to question the prudence of the 
original investment, and to deny upward rate adjustments to cover 
the investments in these plants. Such decisions had, of course, 
a negative impact on the revenues of the utilities and on their 
ability to attract investment capital or to issue bonds for the 
construction of new plants. Utilities have, therefore, adopted a 
capital preservation posture under which they have decided not to 
build new large power plants, but rather to explore other less 
capital-intensive approaches - life-extension of old plants, 
load-management, conservation, and the purchase of power from 
non-utility companies, as well as from Canada and Mexico. 
The uncertainty in the demand for electric power, as well as 
the new economic realities, shifted utility interest toward 
smaller power plants, for which the construction schedules might 
be predictably short and the capital costs of manageable size. 
National Securlty - - Tssues 
l'he oil ernb'irgo by the Organ~zat-ion of Petrole~ln) Export-.ing 
Countr~cs in October 1973, and the Indjan det-onation of a nuclear 
explosive in May 1974, raised new issues related to energy policy 
and to nuclear nonproliferation. 
Prior to 1973, energy questions had been the responsibility 
of the AE;C (nuclear power and nonproliferati.on) and the 
Department of the Interior (DOJ; fossil fuels and the federal 
power marketing agt2nc:ies). In Congress, nuclear issues were 
covered by a powerful Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), 
and the issues of the DOI by single committees in the Senate and 
House. The oil embargo and the Indian nuclear test made energy 
policy and proliferation questions matters of high national 
importance. In the Administration, a Federal Energy Office was 
quickly established in the White House, to be followed by the 
establishment in 1974 of a Federal Energy Administration which 
was, in 1978, to be absorbed into a new Department of Energy 
(DOE). In Congress, the JCAE was abolished in 1974 with the 
responsibility for energy policy being distributed among many 
committees in both the Senate and House. In 1974, the AEC was 
also abolished with the creation of a new NRC and an Energy 
Research and Development Administration (ERDA; the fossil fuel 
RCD act-ivities and the Power Marketing Agencies of the DO1 were 
incorporated into the DOE along with the ERDA in 1978). 
All of these admini-strative reorganizations, undertaken to 
provide for national ecc)nonric independence from oil imports, had, 
of course, an influence on the direction and management of RCD. 
Also, in 1978 Congress passed the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel 
Use Act, which prohibited the use of oil and natural gas in fuels 
for power plants after 1990. In 1980, under the Energy Security 
Act, a Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC) was created to fund the 
development of the production of synthetic fuels from coal and 
oil shale. (The SFC was abolished in 1985.) 
Under t-he aegis of the AEC and the "Atoms for Peace" 
programs, US vendors had, until 1974, positive support in the 
deveiopnrent; and sale of nuclear power plants, both domestically 
and abroad. After 1974, however, circumstances changed. Concern 
about additional proliferation of nuclear weapons capability 
after the Tndian test device in 1974 occasioned a reappraisal of 
the US position. In 1977 thrr Carter Administration decided t:o 
defer the construction of the Clinch Ri-ver Breeder Reactor (CRBR) 
and the reprocessing of nuclear fuel because of concern about the 
potenti-a1 weapons application of the plutonium produced in these 
operations. Jn 1978 Congress passed the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Act (NNPA), which restricted the exports of nuclear hardware. 
While Congress kept the CRBR active until 1982, the net effect of 
the NNPA was to make foreign nations reluctant to rely upon the 
US as a supplier of nuclear equipment and fuels. The competitive 
position of US vendors was, therefore, eroded and made them less 
able, or willing, to support RCD on domestic nuclear projects. 
A l t.c-,ma l- ive T . ' n e r g y - ~ ~ - ~ o g ~ ~ ~ s  
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D11r-inq t-his prbriod of iirrcert;jinty, the p u b l i c  was also 
cr~t r,irlc.rd k)y d ph; I c>sok)hy t h,3t k)i gnr-ss, whet her in pub l i c- 
b~irr~,j~~c-r,+c-ic~s o r  1 r 1  pr-~vdtt, corpor-'+t rorls, reslil I s ln ~rnpdsslvlty, 
jnqcnsit lvlty, a n ~ i  ;1 lust for powrr. T h ~ s  attlt lide was 
eloquently descrlbed by E . F .  Schurn~~chcr in hls book, "Small 1s 
Hr.autlful", publlshcd In 1073. The introd~ictlon to t-hls book 
describes this as a part of the anarchist faith that "small is 
free, efficient, creative, enjoyable, and enduring". 
In the 1970s, there was a general acceptance of this 
philosophy that one should advocate smaller technologies. As a 
result, the program for development of energy technologies took a 
new course. Federal budgets for alternative energy resource 
development increased, tax credits were provided for these 
technologies, and legislation was passed to further encourage the 
adoption of "small" technologies. In 1978, Congress passed the 
Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), which mandated 
that electric utilities buy electricity generated from these 
alternative electric energy sources at "avoided costs"; that is, 
at the rate of highest cost generation otherwise available on the 
utility system. 
In response to public enthusiasm for this decentralization 
philosophy, the government undertook a massive program to support 
alternative energy sources, which affected the RhD programs of 
the vendors and the electric utilities. R&D support for various 
energy technologjes, including alternative technologies, is shown 
in Table 1. This figure demonstrates the dramatic increase and 
subsequent decline in DOE support for energy technologies. This 
rise and fall in federal support for energy R&D has been, of 
course, a destabilizing factor in the interest of vendors to 
invest their own R&D funds in these technologies. 
In a recent report [ill, the Office of Technology Assessment 
of Congress discussed the prospects for a number of these 
developing technologies - wind, solar thermal, photovoltaics, 
geothermal, fluidized bed coal combustion, integrated coal 
gasification, combined gas-steam cycle plants, and batt-ery and 
compressed air storage systems. While the OTA report notes that 
several of these technologies may be significant contrjbutors to 
electric power generation in the future, immediate generation 
needs would have to be met by established technologies. 
As of early 1986, however, some of the circumstances related 
to r~newable energy resources had changed. While t-he "avoided 
cost" purchase of power under PURPA continued, the renewable 
energy tax credits had been discontinued (but may possibly be 
reinstated) and federal R&D support had also been greatly 
reduced. Further investor interest was in doubt. 
This period of uncertainty is not yet over. The Administra- 
tion of President Reagan has stipulated that the government 
should slipport only long-range, high-risk R&D. The 
Administration has also recently advocated a philosophy of 
transferring, to the extent possible, all federal electric 
utility operat~ons to the private sector. Whlle these policy 
~nztiat ivcs by the Adni ni stratlon may not hc acc~pted by 
(:onqr~ss, thc.y do cont ribiite tr) thp scnsP of i~nr.r;rt a ~ n t  y £el t by 
electric u t ~ l l t ~ e s  and t-o the difflc-ulty zn fo~-n~ui<itlng progranjs 
for H & I ) .  
Table 1. Federal support f o r  energy R&D programs: fiscal years 1971-83 (dollars in mi l l ions)  
- - - . - - - -  - --  - -  -- - 
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Actual ~ . t , ~ . t . .  
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--,.,,,-<.. 
Agency and program 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
- . ~. . . - -~ .~~ . ~ - 
Total 5556 5574 $630 $759 51.363 51,649 52.562 K3.134 $3,461 $3.603 K3.501 $2.889 52.034 
- - - -. - - - . - -. . -. . . - 
--  - -- - - -. . . .- - 
Energy Research and 
Technoloqy Adminl5 
t ra t lon (Comrnercel '  
Solar' 
Geothermal 
Hydropower  
Nuclear ftssmn' 
Magnet~c f u r l on  
E lect r~c energy and enmrgy 
YtorayP yysterns 
B io log~cal  and envirnn. 
mental research 
Support ing researr:h 
Foss~l  energy4 
Energy convers~on 
U ranwm enr~chment '  
Other6 
Nuclear Regola!ory 
Commtcx~on 22 26 34 42 64 88 112 137 157 191 227 223 220 
Env~ronmenta l  Protection 
Agency - - - 18 95 90 114 130 113 103 104 52 35 
- ~ . -  ~ 
-. 
I For  f(scr1 years 1971-73 data for the Atomlc  Energy Commission ( A E C I  were used: for  the per iod 1974-76 data for  the Energy Research and 
D e v ~ l o p m e n l  Adrn~n!s t ra t ion ( E R D A I ;  for  1977--80 data for the Department o f  Energy (DOE),  and for  1981-83 data ref lect the proposed Energy 
Reyearch and T e r h n o l o ~ y  A d m ~ n t s t r a t ~ o n  ( E R T A I  Programs. 
' Include. btomas< energy lechnology programs. 
I n r l u d ~ r  fuel cyr,lp R & D ,  space a r ~ d  ter rest r~a l  applications; and nuclear research and aPPl!catlons programs. 
Include< fund: f o r  t h ~  Department o f  the Interior programs. 1971-76. transferred t o  DOE ~n 1977. 
Includes some urannum en r~chmen t  programs that  are included under nuclear fission In 1978-79. 
~ n c l u d ~ s  applted energy technology, 1971-83; advanced technoloq~cal and assessment projects, 1977; and po l icy  analysis and studies. 1978. Pro-  
grams i n  this category were redistr ibuted among various other enerqy programs w i t h  the establishment o f  E R D A  i n  1974, includes funds f o r  the 
ponnev8lle Power Adm~n l s t r a t l on .  1971-76. transferred t o  DOE f rom The Department o f  the Intertor I n  1977. 
I n  1974 the safety aspects o f  A E C  were placed under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) ,  a new agency 
N O T E  Data f o r  1971-77 are shown i n  obligations; data for  1978-83 are shown i n  budget a u t h o r ~ t y .  Detai l  may  n o t  add t o  totals because o f  
rounding. 
Table 1 (Source: 1985, New -- Electric -. - Power Technoloqies: - . 
Problems .- . . -. .-. . -- and Prospects .- - for - -- the . 1990s, ~ Office of 
'J'echnoJogy Assessment, US Congress, Washington, DC) 
The -- - -. F:lect-ric .~ - -. Power - Research Institute 
C o  i l ~ c t  ive support for K & I l  by the electric utilities began 
in 1065 w1.t.h the creation of an organization, the ERC, under 
which utili1:ies participated voluntarily in R&D projects of 
particular interest to them. These projects were contracted to 
industrial organizations and managed by committees of utility 
engineers. By 1970, it became apparent not only that part-time 
management by committees was not ideal, but also that many 
apparent R&D requirements were not being undertaken by either the 
vendors or the government. The ERC, therefore, undertook a study 
of the R&D needs of the industry [121, which was published in 
June 1971, and recommended a program of R&D costing about $30 
billion to the year 2000, and also recommended the creation of 
EPRl to manage it. 
T'hc creation of F : I ) H r  was greatly accelerat-ed by thc 
intrcwi~lction of A h i  l J 1 13 1 in (:nngrcxss by Senator Warrrn 
M,3qnuson t o  crcatc a fcderal Kescarch and Development Hoard to bc. 
fund~d by a 0.15 mi l .L/kwh tax in eJ~ct.ric power genc,ration (ahout. 
1 5 ,  of I-I-v~nues in i.971), and to i,c managed by a government 
organ 1 z a t  i or].  
The leaders of the electric utilities concluded they would 
much prefer an KhD activity undcr their management and asked 
Senator Magnuson to defer consideration of his hill while the 
utiliti-es att-empted to establish their own HhD program as 
recommended in the EHC report. In the fall of 1 9 7 1 ,  agreement 
was reached among the utilities t.hat they would sponsor EPHI, 
which would he funded by its utility members. EPHI was 
incorporated in the District of Colum~ia in March 1 9 7 2 .  The 
Magnuson bill was tabled. 
In terms of innovatjon management, the]-P are several factors 
of import-ance in the procedures established for the operation of 
EPR1. The Institute was t.o be a planning and management 
organization with the R&D projects to be carried out, as much as 
possible, by vendors who would later be suppliers of hardware. 
To the maximum extent possible, elect.ric utilities were to be 
involved in the testing and demonstration of new technologies. 
The H&D program would be planned hy task forces and committees 
compr.i.sed of engi-neers drawn from the utility members of EPHI. 
These procedures did not guarantee that a13 ideas would be 
translated into useful hardware and software; but by involving 
both vendors and utilities, they did provide an approach that 
would attempt to meet the needs of the utilities and also 
encourage vendors to proauce t.he products desired. The 
completion of the innovation process, that is, the transfer from 
the H&D stage to utility use has been, however, a continuing 
problem. EPRI has taken, therefore, several additional 
technology transfer initiatives. 
Utilities have been asked to appoint tee-hnical i nforn~ation 
coordinators whose responsibiljty is to channc3 EPHZ technicai 
reports to the approprj ate indivl d11a l s within ri.1t.i r ut1 3 i.ty. 
bt,i l I t-y engineers have been asked to compietc prof 1 le forms 
indicat i.ng their areas of technical interest. In thei r proposals 
to EPHZ for support for hardware and software development, 
contractors are asked to indicate how they would hring the 
product j nt- o commercial use if t he Hhl) i s succ+cssf u 1 . 
I)uring 1985 ,  a survey was made of some two dozcn member 
utilities to ascertain whether they were using the products of 
EPRI research and whether they were receiving a return on their 
HhD investment at EPHI. The survey indicated a cumulative return 
on the R&D investment of between two-to-one and three-to-one. In 
order to encourage the participation of utility management in 
EPHl affairs, a decision was made in December 1 9 8 5  to increase 
the size of the Board of Directors from 1 5  to 24 members. These 
initiatives reflect the necessity not only for the successful 
development of products from research, but also the equally 
important necessity to pursue actively the transfer of such 
t~chnologies to prosprrt ivt users. 
A s  not.6:d p~-~~:iotisIy~ i - : j ' l { i  %;I!; ~st.,4i); 1 5 k ; !  (j d : i r ~ r t : j  !.:(,rlc)ci bnf 
s i  anif cant rrt.3nqc.s I rl t h c  socia j A I - I ~ ~  t3c.onor;r, c- r;n.c-~ rcirlr,lf%rri . Arl 
la'EIH I repol-t. of Dt-ccmber 1.9t15 i 14 i noi.11~: "!Is .3 c-c)rlsr~.l;,1!,r1c:c., t ilc 
pl annl ng of Hhi) proqrams by k;l't< i has L-)c.rn J I - ~ ; 3 t  I L I n l i l~rnceij 1 ) ~  
rrgu latory req11'1rement-s f o r  t3nv i rc-,nr;rc?ni 1 ~ ~ ~ - i - ~ k ~ ~ ~ - t  I O;i  and p11i;l I c 
health and safety, and by the changing economlc s~tuation. The 
EPHI  R & D  programs have, therefore, shifted over the years from a 
lonq-ranqe emphasls on the development of new technologies to a 
short-ranqe resolution of immed~at-e problems posed by regulatory 
requ~rernents or economics." 
Tn the 1985 E P H l  Annual Report, t-he current situation was 
descr~ bed as follows: 
Today, much of t-he political and economic turmoil 
that marked the 1970s has abated; change and 
uncertainty have become permanent elements in this 
industry's business environment. While the industry 
struggles to gain control of costs that have clearly 
jncreased in all dimensions, competitive pressures have 
greatly intensified as a result of a complex set of 
factors, inclliding a persistently high real cost of 
capital, competition between electricity and other 
forms of energy (in part because of recently softening 
o l l  and gas prices), a fi-rmly entrenched national 
rnvironmental protection ethic, and the rapid growth of 
federal and state regulations. 
With competition emerging as a new and powerful 
driving force in the industry, utility priorities have 
once again shifted. The most important concerns today 
(in order of importance) are reducing and controlling 
the costs of electricity t-o consumers, maintaining and 
enhancing markets for electricity, minimizing 
environmental and financjal risks, and continuing to 
bujld a technoioyical base for the future. 
The  str,3t?qv that stems from this situation includes H A D  
c > m p h a s ~ s  on: ext-ension of t-he plant life of existing coal-flred 
and n u c  i <%dl- pi ant..^; the d~velopment of smaller, modular power 
piants, wnich can be quickly const.rllcted to meet demand growth - 
s l i c f i  as fue I c - r - . l  I s, f luidi zed-t~ed coal combust son; coal 
qasii~catlon comi-~2nd cycle plants; reduction of operation and 
n!,i in t f.nance costs ; management of fuel costs; management of dai j y 
consumer demand t-o reduce need for new generating capacit-y; 
maintenance and enhancement of residential, commercial, and 
industrjal markets for electricity; and minimization of risks 
associatrd with environmental and safety regulation. The 
emphdsjs on technologies for the future includes the development 
of hydrothermal geothermal power plants, photovoltaics, storage 
batteries, compressed-air storage, standardized nuclear power 
plants, and the use of computers in utility operations. This 
strat.c?gy for the EPRI program is, of course, a direct response to 
pol itical and economic circumstances, as well as to technical 
1 -  I i . ' I ' f ~ t b s ~  s a m e  cj rc'umstances wi 1 1 have had eqtja 1 impact 
o r 1  t ! I ( .  H&T! p l - o i j r . + m s  of vi-nrlors and government. All of t.he 
[ I . .  r - r  i(. i !i;irtt.r; i rl t il,. e 1 cct- ri c F1r)wr.r t-ntclrprj sc have h,rd 
r j :  f f I c.il i T ?  in res;~)ncli nq t . o  t h i .  u~ic,$:,rt a i  nt irs 7 r) t ht. ccorlr~nic a n d  
I t r 1 s I i 1 1 ; i t  i c j n  s~nct? 1.970. 'l'hc. or1.i~ certainty is t t ~ a t .  tt~csc 
ur,c:t:~-t.,~ I n : l ~  1 2 5  hi i I c:i:n; lnue. 
V I I I  . CONCLUSIONS 
Management of t.echnological innovation in the electric power 
industry in the USA has undergone significant changes, due to the 
combined effect of market forces, political considerations, and 
social concerns. 
Today, manufacturers have very little incentive to consume 
their own resources because the market is depressed and 
government's policy no longer emphasizes the need to support the 
electric power industry. Thus, the burden of H&D 1j.e~ 
principally with the utility industry. This shift has made the 
prohlem of technology transfer and commercialization a serious 
issue. Manufacturers mlght be quite anxious t-o accept E P R I  
funding for H&D, but when it comes t-o investing their own 
resources to produce the products generated by H & D ,  the attitude 
may he quite different. Here, the market consideration becomes a 
dominant factor. This issue must be addressed by EPHI and the 
utility companies in order to turn inventions into innovation. 
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